Pearson Edexcel

Mark Scheme (Results)

January 2024

Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level in History (WHI04)

Paper 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

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General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

Generic Level Descriptors for Paper 4

Section A

Targets: **AO1 (5 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

AO3 (20 marks): Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	**1–4**	• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included and presented as information, rather than being linked with the extracts. • Judgement on the view is assertive, with little supporting evidence.
2	**5–8**	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. • Mostly accurate knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth. It is added to information from the extracts, but mainly to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. • A judgement on the view is given with limited support, but the criteria for judgement are left implicit.
3	**9–14**	• Demonstrates understanding and some analysis of the extracts by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences. • Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and discussion of the extracts is attempted. A judgement is given, although with limited substantiation, and is related to some key points of view in the extracts.
4	**15–20**	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by a comparison of them. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to explore most of the relevant aspects of the debate, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge. • Valid criteria by which the view can be judged are established and applied and the evidence provided in the extracts discussed in the process of coming to a substantiated overall judgement, although treatment of the extracts may be uneven. Demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.

5	**21–25**	• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors. • Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to explore fully the matter under debate. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments. • A sustained evaluative argument is presented, applying valid criteria and reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.

Section B

Target: **AO1 (25 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	**1–4**	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	**5–8**	• There is some analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited support and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	**9–14**	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although some mainly descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence or precision.
4	**15–20**	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence or precision.

5	**21–25**	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis and discussion of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.

Section A: Indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that Truman's decision to intervene militarily in Korea in June 1950 was mainly because Truman believed that it was 'necessary to maintain US prestige in Asia and across the world'. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • The US response to the North Korean invasion in June 1950 was driven by the strategic concerns of the Truman administration • Truman was responding to an action that he viewed as part of Soviet strategic thinking and, as such, he was responding to a threat to US global prestige • Although Korea was not particularly important to the US, the State Department advised that, if communist aggression in Korea was not dealt with, it would threaten US prestige in both Asia and Europe • The US commitment to fight in Korea, along with the support gained from the UN, was designed to prove US strength to the USSR and China without escalating the war into a global conflict. Extract 2 • The spread of the anti-communism in the USA in the early 1950s, spearheaded by Senator McCarthy, put pressure on Truman and the State Department • Anti-communists were particularly critical of Truman's policies with regard to China, suggesting that Truman could have prevented mainland China becoming communist and that he was ''soft' on communism' • In the spring of 1950, Truman was under great pressure to act decisively with regard to US foreign policy and to make a commitment to protect the security of South Korea • McCarthyism had created such a hostile anti-communist environment within the US that in June 1950 Truman probably had little choice but to take a strong stand in relation to the North Korean invasion. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that Truman's decision to intervene militarily in Korea in June 1950 was mainly because Truman believed that it was 'necessary to maintain US prestige in Asia and across the world'. Relevant points may include: • Truman saw himself as a tough Cold War statesman. In April 1950, the State Department had secretly drafted NSC 68 that advocated the need for US military expansion in the face of communist aggression • Truman was concerned that the invasion was more about Soviet interests in Europe than in Asia. He feared that the Soviets had sponsored the

Question	Indicative content
	North Koreans as a 'sideshow' to taking action along the Iron Curtain • Truman's administration took advantage of a Soviet 'holiday' from the UN Security Council to push through UN support for direct action, so giving the US the 'moral' strategic high ground • The North Korean invasion took place within the context of a growing threat of nuclear war and the victory of communism in China. Truman felt that it was a global security concern that US should be addressing. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that Truman's decision to intervene militarily in Korea in June 1950 was mainly because Truman believed that it was 'necessary to maintain US prestige in Asia and across the world'. Relevant points may include: • Truman's 'hands-off' policy with regard to Far East Asia was seen as being 'soft' on communism by many Americans • The start of McCarthyism coincided with the US decision to wind down its commitments in South Korea. The Korean situation unfolded as Congress investigated communist influences in the State Department • Truman was acutely aware that his domestic standing was dependent on strong foreign policy decisions. Political opponents took every opportunity to be critical • By June 1950, the US was in the grip of a 'Red Scare' with many Americans convinced that communist influence had infiltrated every aspect of life. The North Korean invasion seemed to underline this threat.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945–90

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that both Britain in the Malaysian 'Emergency' and France in the First Vietnam War fought mainly to protect their own economic interests. Arguments and evidence that both Britain in the Malaysian 'Emergency' and France in the First Vietnam War fought mainly to protect their own economic interests should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Post 1945, both the British and the French felt the need to reassert their colonial presence, or at the very least economic influence, in the regions, as they looked to rebuild domestic economies shattered by war • With agreements to restore French power in Vietnam post-Second World War, the French hoped to be able to exploit the resource wealth of Vietnam, particularly rice and rubber, and the supply of cheap labour • Malaya was vital to the British in repaying its war debts to the USA; profits made from tin and rubber interests were specifically used for this purpose • In both regions, opponents of colonialism specifically targeted economic interests and labour issues as part of their campaigns for independence, e.g. in Malaya, the MNLA attacked plantations. Arguments and evidence that both Britain in the Malaysian 'Emergency' and France in the First Vietnam War fought for other reasons should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Both France and Britain fought to maintain their international prestige in the post-Second World War world, where the USA and the Soviet Union were now the major players • France was determined to protect the post-1945 agreement that its sphere of influence in Indo-China should be restored after the wartime Japanese occupation • Both Britain and, to an extent, France were willing to concede future independence in the regions but under their own terms rather than being forced to do so by nationalists • Both fought in order to challenge the spread of communism in south-east Asia at a time when the Cold War was just beginning to emerge, seeing themselves in the vanguard of anti-communism • In Vietnam, the French were encouraged by the US to defend their position after the Communist victory in China; the US supplied weapons and military advisers to aid against Viet Minh attacks • In Malaya, the communist MNLA challenge to British rule only had minority support and Britain claimed to be fighting to protect the majority of Malaysians who wished for a peaceful handover of power. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on whether the ceasefire in 1973 in Vietnam was achieved mainly by concession rather than by the use of force. Arguments and evidence that the ceasefire in 1973 in Vietnam was achieved mainly by concession should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • That negotiations themselves continued to take place in Paris was the result of concessions made over the organisation of the talks, e.g. North Vietnam and the US being the named parties, table configurations • Advancements made under Nixon were based on an underlying concession that US would oversee the withdrawal of its ground troops from Vietnam • In May 1972, the US made a major concession that meant that they would not demand that a condition for US withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam would also be a withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces • In October 1972, there was a breakthrough in negotiations when the North Vietnamese withdrew their long-time demand that Thieu be replaced as South Vietnamese leader • Towards the end of 1972, North Vietnam agreed that negotiators for both the NLF and the South Vietnamese government could participate, so conceding that the war being resolved was a civil war in South Vietnam • In 1969-70, Nixon's attempt to intimidate North Vietnam into a ceasefire, by secretly bombing their supply routes to South Vietnam in Cambodia and Laos, failed to achieve any significant advancement in negotiations. Arguments and evidence that counter or modify the statement that the ceasefire in 1973 in Vietnam was achieved mainly by concession rather than by the use of force should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • Concessions were hard to come by and both sides, despite being in negotiations since 1968, remained resolute in their demands for most of the period. It was the fighting in 1972 that finally forced an outcome • The Phoenix programme was highly effective in the US weakening the communist strength in South Vietnam • The North Vietnamese spring offensive in 1972 was met by the US with a heavy bombing campaign – Operation Linebacker – in North Vietnam. The relative success of both sides brought negotiations back into focus • In December 1972, Nixon used promises of further aid for South Vietnamese forces and the implementation of Operation Linebacker II to get Thieu of South Vietnam to agree to the ceasefire agreement • It was Operation Linebacker II – a massive 12-day aerial bombing campaign against North Vietnam in December 1972 – that forced North Vietnam to agree to the final ceasefire negotiations • In 1972-73, it was a cycle of force and concession combined that led to the ceasefire in Vietnam. Other relevant material must be credited.

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