Mark Scheme (Results)

Summer 2023

Pearson Edexcel International Advanced Level in History (WHI04/1D)

Paper 4: International Study with Historical Interpretations

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

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General Marking Guidance

- All candidates must receive the same treatment. Examiners must mark the first candidate in exactly the same way as they mark the last.
- Mark schemes should be applied positively. Candidates must be rewarded for what they have shown they can do rather than penalised for omissions.
- Examiners should mark according to the mark scheme not according to their perception of where the grade boundaries may lie.
- There is no ceiling on achievement. All marks on the mark scheme should be used appropriately.
- All the marks on the mark scheme are designed to be awarded. Examiners should always award full marks if deserved, i.e. if the answer matches the mark scheme. Examiners should also be prepared to award zero marks if the candidate's response is not worthy of credit according to the mark scheme.
- Where some judgement is required, mark schemes will provide the principles by which marks will be awarded and exemplification may be limited.
- When examiners are in doubt regarding the application of the mark scheme to a candidate's response, the team leader must be consulted.
- Crossed out work should be marked UNLESS the candidate has replaced it with an alternative response.

Generic Level Descriptors for Paper 4

Section A

Targets: **AO1 (5 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

AO3 (20 marks): Analyse and evaluate, in relation to the historical context, different ways in which aspects of the past have been interpreted.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	**1–4**	• Demonstrates only limited comprehension of the extracts, selecting some material relevant to the debate. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included and presented as information, rather than being linked with the extracts. • Judgement on the view is assertive, with little supporting evidence.
2	**5–8**	• Demonstrates some understanding and attempts analysis of the extracts by describing some points within them that are relevant to the debate. • Mostly accurate knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth. It is added to information from the extracts, but mainly to expand on matters of detail or to note some aspects which are not included. • A judgement on the view is given with limited support, but the criteria for judgement are left implicit.
3	**9–14**	• Demonstrates understanding and some analysis of the extracts by selecting and explaining some key points of interpretation they contain and indicating differences. • Knowledge of some issues related to the debate is included to link to, or expand, some views given in the extracts. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and discussion of the extracts is attempted. A judgement is given, although with limited substantiation, and is related to some key points of view in the extracts.
4	**15–20**	• Demonstrates understanding of the extracts, analysing the issues of interpretation raised within them and by a comparison of them. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to explore most of the relevant aspects of the debate, although treatment of some aspects may lack depth. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge. • Valid criteria by which the view can be judged are established and applied and the evidence provided in the extracts discussed in the process of coming to a substantiated overall judgement, although treatment of the extracts may be uneven. Demonstrates understanding that the issues are matters of interpretation.

5	**21–25**	• Interprets the extracts with confidence and discrimination, analysing the issues raised and demonstrating understanding of the basis of arguments offered by both authors. • Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to explore fully the matter under debate. Integrates issues raised by extracts with those from own knowledge when discussing the presented evidence and differing arguments. • A sustained evaluative argument is presented, applying valid criteria and reaching fully substantiated judgements on the views given in both extracts and demonstrating understanding of the nature of historical debate.

Section B

Target: **AO1 (25 marks):** Demonstrate, organise and communicate knowledge and understanding to analyse and evaluate the key features related to the periods studied, making substantiated judgements and exploring concepts, as relevant, of cause, consequence, change, continuity, similarity, difference and significance.

Level	Mark	Descriptor
	0	No rewardable material
1	**1–4**	• Simple or generalised statements are made about the topic. • Some accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but it lacks range and depth and does not directly address the question. • The overall judgement is missing or asserted. • There is little, if any, evidence of attempts to structure the answer, and the answer overall lacks coherence and precision.
2	**5-8**	• There is some analysis of some key features of the period relevant to the question, but descriptive passages are included that are not clearly shown to relate to the focus of the question. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included, but lacks range or depth and has only implicit links to the demands and conceptual focus of the question. • An overall judgement is given but with limited support and the criteria for judgement are left implicit. • The answer shows some attempts at organisation, but most of the answer is lacking in coherence, clarity and precision.
3	**9-14**	• There is some analysis of, and attempt to explain links between, the relevant key features of the period and the question, although some mainly descriptive passages may be included. • Mostly accurate and relevant knowledge is included to demonstrate some understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, but material lacks range or depth. • Attempts are made to establish criteria for judgement and to relate the overall judgement to them, although with weak substantiation. • The answer shows some organisation. The general trend of the argument is clear, but parts of it lack logic, coherence or precision.
4	**15-20**	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by an analysis of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question and to meet most of its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied in the process of coming to a judgement. Although some of the evaluations may be only partly substantiated, the overall judgement is supported. • The answer is generally well organised. The argument is logical and is communicated with clarity, although in a few places it may lack coherence or precision.

5	**21–25**	• Key issues relevant to the question are explored by a sustained analysis and discussion of the relationships between key features of the period. • Sufficient knowledge is precisely selected and deployed to demonstrate understanding of the demands and conceptual focus of the question, and to respond fully to its demands. • Valid criteria by which the question can be judged are established and applied and their relative significance evaluated in the process of reaching and substantiating the overall judgement. • The answer is well organised. The argument is logical and coherent throughout and is communicated with clarity and precision.

Section A: Indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Question	Indicative content
1	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Other relevant material not suggested below must also be credited. Candidates are expected to use the extracts and their own knowledge to consider the views presented in the extracts. Reference to the works of named historians is not expected, but candidates may consider historians' viewpoints in framing their argument. Candidates should use their understanding of issues of interpretation to reach a reasoned conclusion concerning the view that the decision for North Korea to invade South Korea in June 1950 was instigated by Stalin. In considering the extracts, the points made by the authors should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: Extract 1 • In the period April to June 1950, Stalin changed his policy over Korea from one of caution to one that was riskier, in the hope of getting the better of the USA • In April 1950, during a visit to the USSR by Kim Il Sung, Stalin decided to give the go ahead for a North Korean advance into the South • In May-June 1950, Stalin provided aid and military personnel to facilitate an attack on South Korea • Stalin's decision was based on security fears; he feared an attack on North Korea by South Korea and wished to prevent any chance of China coming to an accord with the USA. Extract 2 • The decision to invade South Korea was not made solely by Stalin • The decision to invade South Korea was not made by Kim Il Sung, or as a result of conspiracy between two of the three communist powers involved • There was no overarching plan and, although the go ahead was given by Stalin, a series of decisions was made by leaders who acted in their own self-interest and were not in possession of the full facts • The invasion was the result of a chain of events; Kim Il Sung brought the invasion plan to the table and the USSR and China agreed because it suited their interests at the time. Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to support the view that the decision for North Korea to invade South Korea in June 1950 was instigated by Stalin. Relevant points may include: • Until 1950, Stalin had been very cautious of Kim Il Sung's desire to unify Korea by force and had done everything he could to dissuade Kim from such an action; Kim as a 'loyal communist' had not acted unilaterally • In early 1950, the US indicated a reduction in its commitment to South Korea, Stalin saw this as a window of opportunity to provide a communist show of strength before US policy NSC-68 became operational • Stalin increased Soviet military support for North Korea in 1950, providing more expert personnel but, more importantly, the vital military hardware that would be required for the invasion to take place • Stalin used his decision to secure the Soviet relationship with China; Stalin green-lighted the invasion on the condition that Mao also agreed. Mao was further drawn in by agreeing to provide support to North Korea if needed.

Question	Indicative content
	Candidates should relate their own knowledge to the material in the extracts to counter or modify the view that the decision for North Korea to invade South Korea in June 1950 was instigated by Stalin. Relevant points may include: • Kim Il Sung had a deep desire to unify Korea and believed that the only way to achieve this was by an attack on the South; he relentlessly pursued support from Stalin and manipulated discussions with Mao • Neither Stalin nor Mao had any specific plans, or desire, to facilitate the unification of Korea; Stalin was more concerned with Europe and Mao was focused on Taiwan • Kim's assurances that the invasion would succeed, that South Korea would rise up and that the US were unlikely to intervene, persuaded both Stalin and Mao that the plan could benefit both their wider interests in Asia • Stalin sent Kim to gain the agreement of Mao before he would sign-off the invasion plan; there was no guarantee that Mao would agree. Everything was ad hoc and there was no formal agreement relating to the invasion.

Section B: Indicative content

Option 1D: The Cold War and Hot War in Asia, 1945-90

Question	Indicative content
2	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the significance of the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in the collapse of French power in South East Asia in the years 1945-56. Arguments and evidence that the Battle of Dien Bien Phu was significant in the collapse of French power in South East Asia in the years 1945-56 should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The base at Dien Bien Phu was a symbol of France's determination to continue to hold onto power in Vietnam, and the Viet Minh victory was both militarily and psychologically devastating • The strength of local support, in aiding the Viet Minh to transport men and materials to besiege the base, indicated the extent to which the French had lost the hearts and minds of the Vietnamese people • At Dien Bien Phu, under the command of General Giap, the Viet Minh proved that they were capable of winning a conventional style battle • The reluctance of the US and the British to intervene in the siege of Dien Bien Phu indicated that France could no longer depend on its western Allies for aid in the war against the Viet Minh • The Viet Minh siege of Dien Bien Phu brought to an end a seven-year stalemate in the First Vietnam War and the French surrender brought the hostilities to an end as a whole • The defeat persuaded the French to withdraw completely from South East Asia, and negotiation of the Geneva Accords meant that the last French soldier left Vietnam in 1956. Arguments and evidence that the significance of Battle of Dien Bien Phu in the collapse of French power in South East Asia in the years 1945-56 was limited/other factors were more significant should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • The Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu was only the last element in a Viet Minh struggle to gain independence that had begun in earnest in 1946 • The French had struggled to reassert its power in the wake of the Japanese surrender in 1945; Japanese occupation had undermined French credibility and France was exhausted and demoralised by war • The strength of the Vietnamese independence movement led by Ho Chi Minh and the guerrilla warfare tactics used by the Viet Minh, led by the able General Giap, undermined French political and military power • After 1949, Communist China was willing and able to provide support and aid to its communist ally, Ho Chi Minh; this international support brought global attention to the situation in French Indo-China • The French made mistakes in their control of Vietnam, e.g. making Bao Dai Emperor was seen as creating a 'puppet' ruler • French decolonisation policy had already seen the independence of Laos (1949) and Cambodia (1953) before the siege of Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Other relevant material must be credited.

Question	Indicative content
3	Answers will be credited according to candidates' deployment of material in relation to the qualities outlined in the generic mark scheme. The indicative content below is not prescriptive and candidates are not required to include all the material which is indicated as relevant. Candidates are expected to reach a judgement on the statement that the military failure of the USA in Vietnam was more a consequence of US weaknesses than it was of NLF-Vietcong strengths. Arguments and evidence that that the military failure of the USA in Vietnam was consequence of US weaknesses should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • US tactics often failed and US commanders failed to take advantage of favourable military circumstances, e.g. the limited impact of bombing campaigns, not using the military advantage after the Tet Offensive • US policies failed to win over the 'hearts and minds' of the people they were supposed to be protecting, e.g. the strategic hamlets programme, search and destroy missions, the use of napalm & Agent Orange • US ground troops were mostly conscripts, inexperienced in fighting in jungle terrain against guerrilla tactics and, as the war progressed, discipline and morale began to decline considerably • The US could not depend upon the government or military of South Vietnam to aid it in the conflict; the government was corrupt and unpopular, and the ARVN was weak and poorly trained • US policy was influenced by domestic support for the war. By the end of the 1960s, there was a growing anti-war movement and questioning of policy by the mainstream media, e.g. Operation Phoenix • The US faced international criticism for its intervention in South Vietnam and was unable to gain full backing or material support from Britain and France. Arguments and evidence that that the military failure of the USA in Vietnam was more a consequence of NLF-Vietcong strengths should be analysed and evaluated. Relevant points may include: • There was no vital direct US interest involved in the conflict. The NLF-Vietcong were fighting for a cause that they understood and were determined to achieve, unlike many of the young American conscripts • The NLF-Vietcong were experienced fighters who used guerrilla warfare tactics in a jungle environment with which they were highly familiar; a network of underground tunnel complexes was used for surprise attacks • NLF-Vietcong numbers in South Vietnam were maintained despite a very high rate of casualties and deaths; after search and destroy missions, guerrilla fighters often returned to retake areas almost immediately • The NLF-Vietcong used the Ho Chi Minh Trail continuously to supply their forces in South Vietnam; the network ran through the bordering states of North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia and stretched into Thailand • The NLF-Vietcong had the support of many ordinary people in South Vietnam, particularly in the rural areas where the war was mainly being fought and where US actions had greatest impact on civilians • The NLF-Vietcong were supported internationally, either directly or diplomatically, by communist states, such as North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, China. Wider international sympathy also grew during the conflict. Other relevant material must be credited.

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