Question 1
Evaluate the interpretations in both of the two passages and explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of Bismarck’s role in the unification of Germany in the years from
1867 to 1871.
Passage A
When the victory of 1866 fulfilled Prussia’s traditional policy of seeking supremacy in northern Germany, Bismarck had no further aims in foreign policy. He was content that the southern German states should retain their ‘international, independent existence’ and that the Germans in the Austrian Empire should remain under Habsburg rule. He certainly did not want to fight France. Nor did Napoleon III want to fight Prussia; but French opinion after 1866 drove him to make demands for territorial compensation, and Bismarck took appropriate yet peaceful steps to protect himself against the aggressive mood which this displayed. Of course, Bismarck had to consider the possibility of war against France, but if it should come, he did not want it soon. There is no evidence to support the usual assumption, afterwards asserted by Bismarck himself, that he deliberately intervened in the Spanish marriage question in order to provoke France into war. This would suppose that he planned such a war over a period of years, which is very unlikely. Indeed, there is no certainty about the time when he began to accept the idea of war. Bismarck had nothing to do with the Spanish approach to the Prince Leopold, but he certainly encouraged him to accept the offer when it had been made. This was no doubt another example of his opportunism. The incident gave him the chance to consider the alternative courses, which he always liked to do.
Adapted from: L. Cowie and R. Wolfson, Years of Nationalism: European History, 1815–90, published in 1985.
Passage B
The progress towards a united Germany had reached a political impasse which would have to be resolved by political means. This was to be the achievement of Otto von Bismarck. By a combination of subtle diplomacy and naked militarism, Bismarck appeared to have fulfilled his 1862 prediction that Prussia would unite Germany. Was this sequence of events carefully engineered by a master strategist of Realpolitik*? Bismarck himself certainly tried to create the impression that it was. He stressed the importance of Prussian militarism in German unification and his own role in bringing about the right circumstances. As he told Disraeli, ‘When the army has been brought to such a state as to command respect, then I shall take the first opportunity to declare war with Austria, burst asunder the German confederation, bring the middle and smaller states into subjection, and give Germany a national union under the leadership of Prussia.’ Such apparent confidence in his ability to redirect events was clearly intended for the notice of historians and fellow statesmen. However, it is important to realise that Bismarck was appointed Minister President in an age of growing uncertainty. No statesman could have complete confidence in dictating the course of this change. On the other hand, there was more scope than usual for a brilliant opportunist who was not afraid of experimentation and, as a last resort, war.
*Realpolitik – politics based on practical rather than moral or ideological considerations
Adapted from: S. Lee, Aspects of European History 1789–1980, published in 2015.
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