Question 1
Evaluate the interpretations in both of the two passages and explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of the reasons for the success of the Revolutionary armies in the
Revolutionary Wars of 1792–1802.
Passage A
It was, in fact, the weakness and divided counsels of her enemies rather than her own internal strength that gave France an initial breathing-space and the opportunity to snatch victory from defeat. By the time of her first successes at Valmy and Jemappes in September 1792, the ‘Austrian Committee’ had been overthrown, Brissot and his enthusiasts had lost much of their influence, a few treacherous generals had been cashiered* or had deserted to the enemy, the artillery had been improved, and greater numbers of volunteers had been recruited, trained and equipped. But the major problems still remained: to merge the new citizen soldiers with the old regulars in a single national army; to extract the maximum military advantage from the mass of citizens whom the Revolution made available for service; to find and train an efficient and trustworthy corps of officers; and to equip the army with a steady flow of the latest weapons by harnessing industry to the needs of war. These varying tasks were tackled with considerable success by the combined efforts of the National Convention, of the great Committee of Public Safety and of men like Carnot and the Jacobin military expert, Dubois-Crancé. The national army, based on universal and compulsory conscription, did not finally emerge until September 1798; but a series of intermediate measures served to break down the distinction between the ‘blues’ and regulars and raised armies whose numbers far exceeded those of the Old Regime. Such numbers could, of course, have been more of a hindrance than an asset, and many of the generals reared in the traditions of the past were appalled, rather than delighted, by the influx of recruits. Besides, as the old generals deserted or were cashiered, new commanders were found to take their place – men like Bonaparte, Hoche, Jourdan and Murat. It was such armies and generals as these that, after the initial defeats of 1792 and the Belgian disaster, won an almost unbroken succession of victories from June 1794, carried the war into the enemies’ territory and broke up a succession of coalitions.
* cashiered = dismissed
Adapted from: George Rude, Revolutionary Europe 1783–1815, published in 1964.
Passage B
The greatest motivation for tactical change was simple necessity. The new mass armies raised by the revolutionaries were quickly thrown into the conflict with barely any training. As a consequence the drilled, disciplined infantry, the mainstay of the eighteenth century army, was no longer available to the revolutionary armies. Carnot and the army commanders made a virtue out of necessity by adopting ‘shock tactics’. Since their largely untrained troops had no hope of outfiring the professional infantry lines of their opponents, their only hope was to storm the enemy troops in a blood-curdling bayonet charge before too many of them were cut down by enemy fire. This was the death knell for the ideals and restraints of the limited warfare of the eighteenth century. Carnot and the French commanders reorganised their forces to support shock tactics. To present less of a target to the opposing infantry and artillery the French troops were compressed into attack columns. The columns were not arranged for firepower, they represented a crude, powerful human battering ram to charge at the enemy and break their thin line formation. By 1795, given their numbers, their enthusiasm and their battle-hardened experience, they had grown into the most powerful, menacing army in the world.
Adapted from: Neil Stewart, The Changing Nature of Warfare 1700–1945, published in 2001.
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