Question 1
Evaluate the interpretations in both of the two passages and explain which you think is more convincing as an explanation of the threat posed by the Pilgrimage of Grace to the government.
Passage A
The first great achievement to the historian of the rebels was the size of the force they were able to raise. It was much larger than the royal force. It is worth comparing the size of the rebel hosts with those of other Tudor rebellions as once again this demonstrates the scale of the threat. Just as importantly they were no rabble; many were well-armed. Moreover, they were experienced warriors. Should they have desired to have given battle, it is highly likely that they would have defeated the royal army and been able to launch a quick ride on London.
The size of the force also shows the rebels’ organisational skills and advanced planning, obviously necessary for so many to be raised so quickly. The size and quality of the force meant that they could challenge the crown in battle, but this was not their aim. They wanted to negotiate, but to support this with the potential threat that their numbers gave them. It was the only way to make Henry listen. They had secured Pontefract Castle and seemed to possess every advantage. Royal forces were outnumbered and there was little chance of further royal troops being made available in quick time, certainly not sufficient to stop the pilgrims’ advance. The rebels were in a position to move south; they had secured the gateway to the north and it was their decision to wait. It was the pilgrims who chose to reach a negotiated settlement with the duke of Norfolk.
Adapted from: N. Fellows, ‘The Pilgrimage of Grace’, History Review, published in 2000.
Passage B
The rebels had military superiority, but what use was that when no-one moved in the south, and when any actual campaign would have to start in mid-winter? Besides, they did not want civil war; they just wanted Henry to give in to threats. They consistently proclaimed their loyalty to the king whom they wished only to liberate from evil counsellors, a necessary ploy that was bound to lose them the initiative as long as Henry’s nerve held. And hold it did.
Thanks to the king, the tightrope held. He had further good fortune in the abysmal timing of the Pilgrimage, in part at least a consequence of the fact that the conspirators could not control the forces they had unleashed. Darcy badly mismanaged the whole thing. Nothing was further from the thoughts or from practical politics of Charles V than armed support for the northern rebels. They could not even try to enlist Scottish aid without losing all support among those living on the borders. From first to last, the pilgrims were left on their own, reliant upon coercing a distant king against whom they neither could nor would raise any real threat of deposition.
Neither the plot which in the last analysis lay behind the rebellions, nor the actual unrest of the north in its various manifestations, was ever anything but a futile attempt to arrest the power of the revolution to which Henry had lent his countenance from 1533 onwards.
Adapted from: G. R. Elton, Reform and Reformation: England, 1509–58, published in 1989.
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